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A drop of Rainwater against a drop of Groundwater :
Does Rainwater Harvesting allows us really to spare
groundwater?
Hubert Stahn∗, Agnes TOMINI†
Abstract
This paper is concerned with groundwater management issues in the presence of
rainwater harvesting (RWH). Namely, we propose a two-state model in order to take
into account the standard dynamics of the aquifer and the dynamics of the storage
capacity since the collected rainwater reduces the natural recharge. We analyze the
trade-oﬀ between these two water harvesting techniques in an optimal control model.
We notably show that, when these techniques are pure substitutes, the development
of RWH conducts in the long run to a depletion of the water table even if pumping
is reduced.
Keywords: Rainwater Harvesting, Conjunctive Use, Groundwater Optimal Control
Management, Dynamic Model
JEL: Q25, C61, D61
Introduction
The issue of water management remains a major resource challenge of the 21st cen-
tury registered in the Millennium Development Goals [39]. Such a context motivated
this paper which examines to what extend groundwater resources can be jointly ex-
ploited with rainwater harvesting without unduly depleting the aquifer.
Rainwater Harvesting (abbreviated as RWH) is usually employed as an umbrella
term describing a range of methods of collecting and conserving various forms of
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run oﬀ water. Quoted by Myers [24], Geddes was probably the ﬁrst to deﬁne, in
1963, RWH as the collection and storage of any form of water either runoﬀ or creek
ﬂow for irrigation use and Myers said that it represents the practice of collecting
water from area treated to increase runoﬀ from rainfall or snowmelt. Currier refers
it as the process of collecting natural precipitation from prepared watersheds for
beneﬁcial use. In its broadest sense, RWH can be deﬁned as the collection of water
for its productive use [37]. Despite the few current literature dealing with this topic,
the collection of rainwater used to be adopted by many civilizations and, therefore,
is considered as the oldest technology developed by man to provide water. On the
basis of the review of Gauthier [9], we can notice that the ﬁrst evidence dates back as
6,000 years in the Gangsu region of China. Namely, rain tank storage was particu-
larly important in Southern India where dams were built by the villagers to capture
rainwater from the monsoons [32]. Yet, even if globally rainwater harvesting has
decreased since the 1980s, and traditional systems have been neglected in favor of
large-scale projects, as late as the early 20th century, rainwater was predominantly
used in small islands [19] with no signiﬁcant river systems and in remote and arid
locations [28]. For instance, Gibraltar has one of the largest rainwater collection
systems in existence and rainwater is still the primary water source on many US
ranches. With the expected water crisis, RWH is even a technique enjoying a revival
in popularity. For instance, in the Gangsu province - China, the Gangsu Research
launched projects for water conservancy and by 2000, a total of 2,183,000 rainwater
tanks had been built with a total of 73.1 million cubic meters supplying drinking
water and supplementary irrigation. Perrens [29] estimates that in Australia ap-
proximately one million people rely on rainwater as their primary source of supply.
RWH for potable use also occurs in rural areas of Canada and Bermuda [7].
Given these observational evidences, this paper aims at studying the conjunc-
tive use of groundwater and RWH within an optimal control framework. Namely,
we propose a two-state model with pure state constraints in order to take into ac-
count the standard dynamics of groundwater and the dynamics of RWH which is
assimilated to a capital accumulation law. Actually, rainwater can be collected into
various reservoirs such as rain tanks but all this equipment require, in any case, the
development of a harvesting capacity through progressive investment.
This RWH capacity does however not work like a backstop technology in the
sense of Heal [13], Dasgupta and Heal [6]. Recent studies extend this approach to
groundwater resource (see for instance Kim and al. [17], Krulce and al [20], Holland
and Moore [21], or Koundouri and Christou [16]). In fact, most of these papers, in
the best of our knowledge, assume the existence of an alternative water source, often
available at a constant average cost, which can be substituted to groundwater and
address the question of the optimal switch time since the marginal water extraction
cost increases with the depth of the water table. But it is often implicitly assumed
that this alternate water source is exogenous like seawater desalinization, water im-
2
port or even new water sparing irrigation techniques. This means, in other word,
that the switch to one of these alternate technique has no direct inﬂuence on the
dynamic of the water table. This is typically not the case of RWH, especially in dry
areas, since rainwater largely contributes to replenishment of the aquifer.
We deal therefore with an atypical conjunctive use system. In fact in the line of
Gemma and Tsur [10], the term conjunctive signiﬁes that the ground and surface
water sources are two components of one system and should be managed as such.
This clearly means that the dynamics of our two sources of water must be analyzed
simultaneously which is the case in our paper. But, the second source is, here, a
special kind of a surface water because it is the rainwater which can be harvested
by the existing capacity. From that point of view, especially in dry areas RWH
aﬀords an alternative to groundwater use while in this conjunctive use literature (see
for instance Tsur and Graham-Tomasi [38], Knapp and Olson [18] or Chakravorty
and Umetsu [4]) groundwater is more viewed as an additional resource which insures
against ﬂuctuations in the amount of surface water or which helps in the organization
of the production along a river. In our view, RWH is more considered as a substitute
to pumping but the two techniques use the same resource since the former diminishes
the natural recharge of the aquifer.
Our purpose, in this paper, is therefore to outline a trade-oﬀ between groundwater
pumping and the collection of rainwater through investments in harvesting capital
and, since both uses the same resource, to evaluate the eﬀect of this practice on the
level of the water table. We notably show that even if this two water harvesting
techniques are pure substitutes, the development of RWH conducts in the long run
to a depletion of the water table.
This puzzling result is not even based on strategic dynamic externalities between
water users since we deliberately choose a social planner approach and therefore do
not enter the debate around the Gisser Sanchez Eﬀect1. This result comes from the
existence of both a short and long-run eﬀect directly issued from the implementation
of an investment strategy. If we start with the last one , we can say that as soon
as a quantity of capital is used to collect rainwater then a sustainable principle
induces a reduction of the ground water use in the same proportion since the total
withdrawn must be less then the rate on replenishment. But in the short run, when
an investment occurs, the social planner has an incentive to postpone this adjustment
in order to beneﬁt from additional amount of water especially in the constitution of
a harvesting capacity is not to costly. These gains are, of course, transitory since
the cost of water extraction increases, in this case, across time. But this short term
eﬀect contributes to an additional depletion on the resource and therefore to a lower
steady state equilibrium. Thus, the collection of rainwater does not allow really to
1The paper of Gisser and Sanchez [11] gives rise to a large debate on the necessity to regulate
private goundwater use in order to obtain the social planer associates solution (see Negri [25]
Provencher [30] Provencher and Burt [31], Santiago-Rubio [35] and Rubio-Casino [33] among others)
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spare groundwater.
In order to illustrate this point, we proceed in tree steps. We ﬁrst introduce a
rather general model of water extraction in order to characterize the optimal har-
vesting strategy and to identify the steady state. In a second step, we allow RWH.
This gives us the opportunity, by starting with steady state trajectory without RWH,
to illustrate at least intuitively our argument by showing that an optimal planner
who is willing to invest in the RWH technique has also an incentive to postpone
the adjustment of her quantity of harvested groundwater and therefore induces a
long term eﬀect. But this argument is only obtain by considering deviations from a
steady state trajectory without investment. This is why we verify, in a third step,
this intuition within an optimal control model in which the social planner has the
ability to choose both the groundwater extraction level on the investment in a RWH
capacity.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model by em-
phasizing all mathematical notations and the convenient assumptions for our model.
Section 3 is dedicated to study of the optimal groundwater extraction within this
setting in order to characterize both the dynamic and the steady state. In section ,4
we introduce RWH, illustrate the idea that the planner has to deviate from the pre-
vious steady state and provide some intuition of the long run eﬀect of this deviation.
Section 5 analyzes the optimal behavior under both the groundwater extraction and
the investment in a RWH capacity and concludes to a depletion of the resource with
respect to the case without RWH. Finally, a brief discussion and concluding remarks
are oﬀered in section 6. All the proofs are relegated to an appendix.
1 The model
We start from a dynamic, continuous time model of groundwater management for an
aquifer with a constant and natural2 recharge R. The upper-surface of groundwater
is called the water table which can rise in response to natural recharge and fall
because of seasonally dry weather, drought or water pumping. Therefore, water
table levels in aquifers represent the combined eﬀects of the rate of recharge and the
rate of discharge and, consequently, the amount of available water. To this end, the
measurement of the depth of the aquifer is relevant for groundwater management.
By the way, assume that the depth measuring at period t is d(t). Obviously, if the
water table reaches its upper limit, we can consider that the aquifer is full and we
set d(t) = 0. At the opposite, if the aquifer is totally empty then the depth reaches
its maximum level denoted by d. Moreover, we assume the aquifer is characterized
by a ﬂat bottom and perpendicular sides. Therefore, the level of the water table is
2A natural recharge results from snowmelt, precipitation or storm runoﬀ. In this model, we rule
out artiﬁcial recharge, i.e. the use of water coming from other sources to replenish the aquifer
4
the same in each point of the aquifer. Considering that the water table is shallower
with the natural recharge R and deeper with the extraction wg(t), the dynamics of
the water table across the time is normally given by d˙(t) = wg(t)−R.
In addition, we want to take into account the idea that water users have also the
ability to capture directly a part of the natural recharge R by developing a collecting
capacity of water harvesting such as rainwater tanks. We denote by ws(t) ≤ R the
quantity that is directly withdrawn. However, harvesting rainwater is a way to stop
the rainwater from hitting the ground and, therefore, replenishing the aquifer. Thus,
the recharge that reaches the ground is reduced by the amount R − ws(t) and the
water depth dynamic is now given by :
d˙(t) = wg(t)− (R− ws(t)) (1)
Then, the total amount of water w = ws + wg which is obtained by harvesting
and by pumping is aﬀected to alternative uses. In fact, both factors can be used
as two perfect substitutable inputs. Thus, we assume that a combination of these
production factors provide a set of services which are measured by a social beneﬁt
function F (w) which behaves like a standard production function. More formally,
we assume that :
Assumption 1 The social beneﬁt of the use of water are measured by a C∞ function
F : R+ → R+ which satisﬁes (i) F ′ (w) > 0, (ii) F” (w) < 0, (iii) F (0) = 0, (iv)
lim
w→0
F ′(w) = +∞ and (v) lim
w→+∞F
′(w) = 0
The use of this amount w of water is however not free of charge. Groundwater
withdrawals induce some pumping costs while any harvesting capital requires some
investment in order to develop and to maintain a harvesting capacity of ws.
To be more precise, we assume as usually in this literature ([15] and [35]) that
the resource exploitation involves a cost C(wg, d) depending on the amount that is
pumped and on the depth of the water table. Thus, we are able to capture two
basic principles. The ﬁrst one stems from the fact that, at lower water tables, it is
more costly to extract water because the resource must be pumped farther distances.
Therefore, the marginal cost of pumping a unit of water is increasing with the depth
of the water table (i.e. ∂2wg ,dC(wg, d) > 0). Then, the second principle is related to
the dynamic of the model. Actually, the use of an additional unit of water, at a given
period of time, decreases the water table and, according to this new level, rises all
the future extraction costs : this is a crucial point while this natural resource has an
economic value.
Beyond this two basic principles, we also assume decreasing return to scale in the
sense that :
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• the marginal cost of extracting water is inﬁnitely increasing when the quantity
of water tends to inﬁnite. We however do not assume that the marginal extrac-
tion cost of the ﬁrst unit of water is always zero because, of course, the depth
of the water table surely matters. We simple require that this marginal cost is
bounded from above, this bound being perhaps very large when the aquifer is
almost empty.
• the pumping cost are increasing with the depth of the water table at an in-
creasing rate. But, when no water is taken the depth of the water table does
not really matter in the cost function. This implies in particular, by abuse of
notation, that ∂dC(0, d) = 0 since C(0, d) is assumed to be constant. Further-
more, this assumption follows the usual total pumping cost which is linear in
pumping lift.
• this cost function is strictly convex or, in other words, that the Hessian of this
function is a negative deﬁnite matrix.
More formally, we say that :
Assumption 2 The groundwater extraction costs are given by a C∞ function C :
R+ ×
[
0, d¯
]→ R+
(i) ∂wgC(wg, d) > 0, ∂2wg ,wgC(wg, d) > 0,
∀d, ∂wgC(0, d) < K bounded from above and limwg→∞ ∂wgC(wg, d) = +∞
(ii) ∀wg > 0, ∂dC(wg, d) > 0, ∂2d,dC(wg, d) > 0 and ∂dC(0, d) = 0
(iii) ∂2wg ,wgC(wg, d) · ∂2d,dC(wg, d)−
(
∂2wg ,dC(wg, d)
)2
> 0
(iv) ∂2wg ,dC(wg, d) > 0
In addition, we also allow for water harvesting, a new aspect within this literature.
But, this technology requires an investment in order to build and to maintain this
irrigation capacity. To keep the model as simple as possible, we however assume, as
usual in a standard growth model, that this capacity can be adjusted instantaneously.
This means, in other words, that this capacity coincides with the level of harvested
water and that its dynamics takes into account not only the investment I which is
realized each period at some cost Θ(I) but also the depreciation of this capital which
is measured by the function δ(ws). The dynamics of the capital stock across time is
therefore given by the relation :
w˙s(t) = I(t)− δ(ws(t))
Instead of taking a linear depreciation function, we prefer to keep a more gener-
alized form which ﬁts with some standard assumptions. Eﬀectively, we assume that
6
the depreciation function is an increasing strictly convex function. The depreciation
is increasing with the amount of capital at an accelerated rate. Moreover, when there
is no capital, there is obviously no depreciation and, we assume furthermore that the
ﬁrst unit of capital does not imply any depreciation.
In parallel, the underlying costs of adjustment that must be paid out of operating
proﬁts are increasing and strictly convex in I as in Abel and Eberly [1]. Like for the
depreciation function, we assume that there is no adjustment cost for non-existing
investment and the ﬁrst unit of investment does not involve any charge.
More formally, we set that :
Assumption 3 The water harvesting technique is characterized by a C∞ investment
cost Θ : R → R+ and a C∞ depreciation function δ : R+ → R+ which respectively
satisfy :
(i) ∀I > 0, Θ′(I) > 0, Θ′′(I) > 0 and Θ(0) = Θ′(0) = 0
(ii) ∀ws > 0, δ′ (ws) > 0, δ” (ws) > 0 and δ(0) = δ′(0) = 0
Before going further, we introduce the two following assumptions :
• If the aquifer is full (d = 0) and only the natural recharge is consumed (wg =
R), there is always an incentive, at least marginally, to pump an additional
quantity of water even by taking into account the increase in future extraction
cost induced by a change in the water table.
• At the opposite, the marginal cost of extracting the last unit of water when
the aquifer is empty (d = d¯) is very high, at least higher than the marginal
productivity of the recharge. Furthermore, we assume that marginal cost of in-
vestment deﬁning by the product of the marginal adjustment cost with the sum
of the discount rate and the depreciation rate when we have already invested
to capture the entire recharge R is larger than the marginal cost of extracting
the last unit of water when the aquifer is empty. Beyond the mathematical
convenience of this assumption, it is quite credible that the marginal cost of
investment is very large when we have already collected all the recharge com-
pared to the cost of one unit of groundwater when the aquifer is empty whereas
we do not pump any quantity.
These assumption can be written as :
Assumption 4 Let us assume that
(i) F ′(R)− ∂wgC(R; 0)− 1ρ∂dC(R; 0) > 0
(ii) Θ′ (δ(R)) (ρ+ δ′(R)) > ∂wgC(0, d¯) > F ′(R)
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2 The standard groundwater management model
The social planner will choose the optimal extraction path maximizing the total
present values of social welfare. Formally, the social planner's problem is given by :
max
wg(t)∈Ω1(d(t))
J1 (wg(t), d(t)) =
∫ ∞
0
[F (wg(t))− C(wg(t), d(t))] e−ρtdt (2){
d˙(t) = wg(t)−R, d(0) = d0, d(∞) free
wg(t) ≥ 0, d(t) ≥ 0, d− d(t) ≥ 0
This is typically an autonomous optimal control problem with a mixed and two
pure state constraints. Moreover, by using the so-called indirect approach3 we know
that the set of admissible control values is given by :
Ω1(d(t)) =
{
wg ∈ R+ : wg ≥ R if d(t) = 0, wg ≤ R if d(t) = d¯
}
The associated current-value Hamiltonian with co-state variable p(t) is deﬁned
by
H1 (wg(t), d(t), p(t)) = [F (wg(t))− C(wg(t), d(t))] + p(t) · (wg(t)−R)
It is immediate that H1 is strictly concave with respect to wg. Moreover, since the
admissible control set is convex, we can even expect the following properties.
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions (1) and (2), this optimal control problem
(i) is regular (the argmaxwg∈Ω1(d)H1 (wg, d, p) is a singleton for all d and p).
(ii) admits an optimal control path w˜g(t) which is continuous and strictly positive.
(iii) satisﬁes the constraint qualiﬁcation.
(iv) has the property that the co-state variable p˜(t) and the Hamiltonian along the
optimal path are continuous.
Hence, from lemma 1, we know that the mixed constraint wg(t) ≥ 0 can be
forgotten. Thus, we can now introduce the following Lagrangian aﬃliated to the
program (2) :
L1 (wg(t), d(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t)) = H1 (wg(t), d(t), p(t))+q1(t) ·d(t)+q2(t) ·
(
d− d(t))
where q1(t) and q2(t) are the multiplicative associated to the two pure state
constraints. We can now claim that a solution to our problem satisﬁes the following
3The indirect approach consists of adjoining a function instead of the pure state constraints. For
more details, see Seierstad and Sydsaeter [36] or Grass and al. [12]
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Almost Necessary Conditions (see Seierstad and Sydsaeter [36] theorem 9 p.381 and
note 6 p.374 or Grass and al. [12] theorem 3.60 p.149)
F ′(wg(t))− ∂wgC(w(t), d(t)) + p(t) = 0 (3)
p˙(t) = ρp(t) + ∂dC(wg(t), d(t))− q1(t) + q2(t) (4)
with the complementary slackness conditions :{
q1(t) ≥ 0 q1(t) · d(t) ≥ 0
q2(t) ≥ 0 q2(t) ·
(
d− d(t)) ≥ 0
Before going further, it is interesting in noticing that the two pure state constraints
are never binding.
Lemma 2 When an optimal control is at work, it is impossible to ﬁnd a period of
time ]t0, t1[ for which
(i) the aquifer is totally full, i.e. d˜(t) = 0.
(ii) the aquifer is totally empty, i.e. d˜(t) = d¯
If the Hamiltonian H1 (wg, d, p) is strictly concave in (wg, d) and the diﬀerent
constraints are quasi-concave in these variables, we can even say by using Mangasar-
ian type suﬃcient conditions (see Seierstad and Sydsaeter [36] theorem 11 p.385)
that, in our case, the optimal solution satisﬁes the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Any triple (w∗g(t), d∗(t), p∗(t)) of functions which satisﬁes
F ′(w∗g(t))− ∂wC(w∗g(t), d∗(t)) + p∗(t) = 0 (5)
p˙∗(t) = ρp∗(t) + ∂dCd(w∗g(t), d
∗(t)) (6)
d˙∗(t) = w∗g(t)−R (7)
lim
t→∞ p
∗(t) (d(t)− d∗(t)) ≥ 0 for all admissible d(t) (8)
is the unique optimal solution.
At that point, the reader may perhaps be surprised by our treatment of the
shadow price p∗(t) compared to the rest of the literature ([15] and [35]). Usually,
this marginal user cost is equal to the royalties, at the optimum. However, this
follows directly from the fact that we use as a state variable the depth of the aquifer
instead of its height. From that point of view, p∗(t) does not measure the long
run beneﬁt from a marginal increase of the water table along the optimal path but
measures exactly the opposite since an increase in the depth induces a decline in the
water table. This means, in other words, that when we move to a representation into
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the state-control space, we will come back to a standard representation. In fact, in
this space, the dynamics of our system can be represented by :
A(wg(t), d(t)) ·
[
w˙g(t)
d˙(t)
]
= b(wg(t), d(t))
with
A(wg(t), d(t)) =
[ −F” (wg(t)) + ∂2wg ,wgC(wg(t), d(t)) ∂2w,dC(wg(t), d(t))
0 1
]
and b(wg(t), d(t)) =
[
ρ (−F ′(wg(t)) + ∂wC(wg(t), d(t))) + ∂dCd(wg(t), d(t))
wg(t)−R
]
Hence : w˙g(t) = ρ(F
′(wg(t))−∂wC(wg(t),d(t)))−∂dC(wg(t),d(t))
F”(wg(t))−∂2wg,wgC(wg(t),d(t))
+
∂2wg,dC(wg(t),d(t))·(wg(t)−R)
F”(wg(t))−∂2wg,wgC(wg(t),d(t))
= W (wg(t), d(t))
d˙(t) = wg(t)−R
which can be a rather complicated dynamics. But the deﬁnition of the steady state
remains quite simple : it is given by b(w∗g , d∗) = 0. Moreover the matrix D which
describes the ﬁrst order approximation of this system in the neighborhood of this
point, is rather tractable. It is after some computations given by :
D =
[
∂wgW (wg, d)
∣∣
(w∗g ,d∗)
∂dW (wg, d)|(w∗g ,d∗)
1 0
]
=
 ρ
(
F ”−∂2wg,wgC
)
F”−∂2wg,wgC
∣∣∣∣∣
(w∗g ,d∗)
−ρ∂
2
wg,d
C+∂2d,dC
F”−∂2wg,wgC
∣∣∣∣
(w∗g ,d∗)
1 0

This is why we can say that :
Proposition 2 If we concentrate our attention on the steady state, we observe that
(i) This point is unique and is given by w∗g = R and d∗ ∈
]
0, d¯
[
which satisﬁes
F ′(R)− ∂wC(R, d∗)− 1
ρ
∂dCd(R, d∗) = 0
(ii) at least locally (i.e. at a neighborhood of the steady state), this two-dimensional
system admits a unique saddle path which converges to the steady state
To conclude, this model is suitable to determine to what extend groundwater can
be withdrawn without compromising the resource for the future. On this basis, any
deviation can be analyzed when a new water source becomes accessible.
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3 Potential variations of the basic steady state
The previous section presents a model where groundwater is used as a single source
of irrigation. Now, we introduce the possibility to harvest a quantity ws(t) of rain-
water at the period t in order to extend freshwater source. Thereby, rainwater and
groundwater will be used simultaneously as substitutable inputs in the production
function such that F (wg(t) + ws(t)).
The collection of rainwater harvesting stems from the amount of investment made
by water users. For convenience, we assume for the moment that there is no capital
depreciation. Thus, if investment is incitive we can expect that a part of groundwa-
ter will be substituted by an equivalent quantity of rainwater and, without long-run
eﬀect, the depth of the water table will not be aﬀected. However, we are going to
show that this intuition is wrong or, in other words, that there exists a long-run eﬀect
resulting from the investment and, thus, inﬂuencing the level of the water table.
In order to illustrate this mechanism, we are going to use some principles of the
calculus of variations. We already know the optimal extraction path highlighting in
the basic groundwater model in which w∗g(t) = R. Then, we analyze a deviation from
this optimal trajectory by allowing to invest a constant amount ∆I during a ﬁnite
period t ≤ tI . After that, no more investment will be made. Thus, the variation of
the investment I(t) is written such that :
I(t) =
{
∆I ∀t ≤ tI
0 ∀t > tI
Since there is no capital depreciation, the variation of rainwater harvesting comes
directly from the investment. Thus, we set :
w˙s(t) = I(t) (9)
Moreover, we can compute the quantity of stored rainwater by adding all water
collected at each period :
ws(t, I(t)) = ws(0) +
∫ t
0
w˙s(t)dt (10)
=
{
∆I · t ∀t ≤ tI
∆I · tI ∀t > tI (11)
Since this technology has just been introduced, it is obvious that the initial condition
is ws(0) = 0.
Up to now, the social planner has two resources which can be combined in various
ways. In fact, it is intuitive to observe that he faces with two strategies : either he
continues to extract exactly the recharge from the ground in addition to a quantity
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of rainwater or he chooses to adjust his withdrawals to the amount of the harvested
rainwater. However, given that w∗g(t) = R, then the dynamics (1) becomes d˙(t) =
ws(t). Therefore, under the assumption that investment is incitive then the depth
of the water table will be increasing across time, with ws(t) > 0. This means that
the aquifer will become deeper until reaching its bottom d. Therefore, a strategy
without adjustment is not admissible.
Given this observation, let twg the period from which a strategy of substitution is
implemented. Obviously, the adjustment will also depend on the investment switch
time. Thus, the amount of groundwater that is pumped can be written as following :
wg(t) =

R ∀t ≤ twg
R−∆I · t ∀twg < t ≤ tI
R−∆I · tI ∀t > tI ≥ twg
(12)
Hence, we can compute the level of the water table :
d (t, wg(t), I(t)) = d(0) +
∫ t
0
d˙(t)dt
=
{
d0 + ∆I · t22 ∀t ≤ twg
d0 + ∆I · t
2
wg
2 ∀t > twg
(13)
We can observe that there is a long run eﬀect ∆I · t
2
wg
2 when the substitution is
not immediate.
Now, we can derive the social net beneﬁt when such a variation is made. It is
deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the production function and the total cost which is
the sum of the extraction cost and the investment adjustment cost. Thus, the total
present values of the social welfare is given by the following functional :
J
(
∆I, twg , tI
)
=
∫ twg
0
(
F (R+ ∆I · t)− C
(
R, d0 + ∆I · t
2
2
)
−Θ(∆I)
)
exp−ρt dt
+
∫ tI
twg
(
F (R)− C
(
R−∆I · t, d0 + ∆I ·
t2wg
2
)
−Θ(∆I)
)
exp−ρt dt
+
∫ ∞
tI
(
F (R)− C
(
R−∆I · tI , d0 + ∆I ·
t2wg
2
)
−Θ(0)
)
exp−ρt dt (14)
Obviously, such a strategy will be implemented if it is proﬁtable. In other words,
investment must generate a higher proﬁt even if there are additional costs. We can
show that investing to store rainwater is a beneﬁcial choice compared to using only
groundwater for irrigation even if the adjustment between rainwater and groundwater
is applied at the beginning.
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Remark 1 It is always interesting in investing even if we adjust the extraction at the
beginning, i.e twg = 0.
lim
∆I→0+
J (∆I, 0, tI)− J(0, 0, 0)
∆I
=
(
1− exp−ρtI)
ρ
1
ρ
∂wgC (R, d0)−Θ′(0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
 > 0 (15)
In eﬀect, the actualized marginal pumping cost when we have already extracted
the recharge is greater than the marginal cost of investment when we did not invest
yet. Therefore, there is an interest in investing in this irrigation capacity.
However, we have already observed that a strategy of substitution must be im-
plemented with investment. But, here is no reason so as not to postpone the time
of adjustment. In fact, we can even demonstrate that there exists an interest in
substituting both resources after a short period.
Remark 2 The adjustment strategy is not optimal when it is applied at the beginning
because it is a local minimum.
∂twgJ
(
∆I, twg , tI
)∣∣∣
twg=0
= 0, ∂2twg ,twgJ
(
∆I, twg , tI
)∣∣∣
twg=0
> 0 (16)
Thus, during a short period, the production will temporarily increase.
As result, we have illustrate the idea that investment is a beneﬁcial strategy but
it must come with a substitution between rainwater and groundwater withdrawals
in order to prevent from depleting the aquifer. However, beyond this substitution,
various eﬀects inﬂuence the structure of costs. Actually, the collection of rainwater
implies that the natural recharge that reaches the ground is reduced by R − ws(t).
Thus, additional costs are involved because water users are going to pump water at
farther distance. Consequently, this mechanism incites to invest and to continue to
extract an amount equal to the recharge during a short period. Thereby, when the
substitution will be actual, there will remains a long-run eﬀect that explains that
the level of the water table will be deeper.
Obviously, this is only the intuition of the mechanism that is at work since we have
looked at a rather peculiar deviation from the path which was given by the steady
state without water harvesting. It remains now to establish this result more formally
by looking at the optimal choice of a social planner which has the opportunity to
pump groundwater and to develop some harvesting capacity. In fact, we will argue
in two steps. We are ﬁrst looking at the optimal path in order to highlight the idea,
among others, that has always an incentive to develop a harvesting capacity and
to maintain (when there are a natural depreciation of this capital) some investment
across time. Then, we will move in a second step to the study of the new steady
state that we completely characterize in order to evaluate the long term eﬀect of
water harvesting.
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4 Groundwater extraction and investment
The social planner will now choose the optimal paths of groundwater and investment
maximizing the total present values of the social welfare. This problem is very closed
to the previous one. We simply add the ability to obtain a harvesting capacity by
making a costly investment, this capacity being non negative and bounded by the
natural recharge of the aquifer. Formally, the problem becomes :
max
w(t),I(t)
∫ ∞
0
(F (wg(t) + ws(t))− C(wg(t); d(t))−Θ(I(t))) e−ρtdt (17)
subject to :

d˙(t) = wg(t) + ws(t)−R, with d(0) = 0
w˙s(t) = I(t)− δ(ws(t)) with ws(0) = 0
wg(t) ≥ 0, d(t) ≥ 0, d− d(t) ≥ 0
ws(t) ≥ 0, R− ws(t) ≥ 0
We will denote by H2
(
wg(t), I(t), wg(t), d(t), (pi(t))
2
i=1
)
the Hamiltonian associated
to this program with p1(t) and p2(t) the two co-state variables related respectively
to the dynamic of the aquifer and of the harvesting capacity.
L2
(
wg(t), I(t), wg(t), d(t), (pi(t))
2
i=1 , (qi(t))
5
j=1
)
stands for the associated Lagrangian
where the qi(t) are associated to the ﬁve constraints. If we now move to the study
of this program, we ﬁrst observe that :
Lemma 3 The constraint qualiﬁcation property is satisﬁed.
From that point of view, we can say that (wg(t)I(t), ws(t), d(t)) is an optimal solution
path with only ﬁnitely many time junctions, if there exists piecewise absolutely
continuous functions (pi(t))
2
i=1, and (qi(t))
5
j=1 ≥ 0 as well as a vector
(
ηi,t¯
)4
i=1
at
each junction point t¯ which satisﬁes the following conditions:
F ′ (wg(t) + ws(t))− ∂wgC(wg(t), dt(t)) + p1(t) + q1(t) = 0
−Θ′(I(t)) + p2(t) = 0
p˙1(t) = ρp1(t) + ∂dtC (wg(t), d(t))− q2(t) + q3(t)
p˙2(t) = p2(t) (ρ+ δ′(ws(t)))− F ′(wg(t) + ws(t))− p1(t)− q4(t) + q5(t){
q1(t) · wg(t) = 0, q2(t) · d(t) = 0, q3(t) ·
(
d− d(t)) = 0
q4(t) · ws(t) = 0 and q5(t) · (R− ws(t)) = 0
and at each junction point t¯, there exists
(
ηi,t¯
)4
i=1
≥ 0 with the property that :{
p1(t¯+) = p1(t¯−)− η1,t¯ + η2,t¯
p2(t¯+) = p2(t¯−)− η3,t¯ + η4,t¯ and
{
η1,t¯ · d(t¯) = 0, η2,t¯ ·
(
d− d(t¯)) = 0
η3,t¯ · ws(t¯) = 0, η4,t¯ · (R− ws(t¯)) = 0
Moreover, we can even say that
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Lemma 4 Under our assumptions, any path
(
w˜g(t), I˜(t), w˜s(t), d˜(t)
)
which satisﬁes
the previous conditions is an optimal path providing that :
lim
t→+∞ p1(t)
(
d(t)− d˜(t)
)
+ p2(t) (ws(t)− w˜s(t)) = 0
for all admissible (ws(t), d(t))
In fact, a more in-depth perusal of such a programm shows that the optimal path
has several characteristics that are relevant to describe it. Proposition 3 presents
those properties.
Proposition 3 The optimal path has several interesting properties. We can note
that :
(i) Water is always used since wg(t) + ws(t) > 0.
(ii) The harvesting capacity is always strictly positive i.e ws(t) > 0.
(iii) When water is pumped (wg(t) > 0) there is always a strictly positive investment
(I(t) > 0).
(iv) When no water is pumped (wg(t) = 0), the harvesting capacity does not reach
the recharge (ws(t) < R).
(v) If the aquifer is either full or empty for a while (i.e. ∃ ]t0, t1[, ∀t, d(t) = 0, d¯) the
harvesting capacity changes across time (i.e w˙s(t) 6= 0).
The ﬁrst point insures that we will always observe an active productive sector
using at least one of the two sources of water. In fact, if we can observe that when no
rainwater is harvested then, from assumption 4, this observation means that water
users do no pay out any investment cost and, we obtain a situation equivalent to
the scenario using groundwater as a single input where extraction occurs. Besides,
the second point goes into detail in the sense that the optimal path is characterized
by the implementation of the harvesting technology. This property is quite intuitive
in accordance with what we have learnt in the previous section. The third point
goes a step further. It tells us that as soon as groundwater is extracted, there is an
investment in a harvesting capacity. This also insures that a part of the deteriorated
capital is replaced in order to maintain the technology. The last properties provide
some intuition on the steady state. According to the fourth point, if there is no
withdrawal, then it is not optimal to maintain a harvesting capacity a the level of
the recharge. Since in the long run, all the recharge is used this suggested that water
is extracted in the steady state. Finally,by the ﬁfth point, if the aquifer is either full
or empty along the optimal path there must be some adjustments in the harvesting
capacity. In other word it is impossible to reach a steady state when the aquifer
cannot reach its boundaries.
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5 The long term eﬀect on the aquifer
Let us now show that the introduction of water harvesting techniques has a long run
eﬀect on the aquifer : it induces a lower equilibrium level of the natural resource. This
long run stationary equilibrium typically solves the set of equations (18) with p˙1(t) =
p˙2(t) = 0, the set (18) and has the property that w˙s(t) = d˙(t) = 0. We therefore
know that the harvesting capacity must be equal to the recharge net of the used
groundwater (i.e. w∗s = R − w∗g), the investment must compensate the depreciation
of this capacity (i.e. I∗ = δ(R − w∗g)) and the shadow price of this capacity reﬂects
the marginal cost of this long term investment (i.e. p∗2 = Θ′(δ(R − w∗g))). We
can even observe that the shadow price associated to the aquifer depth is given by
p∗1 = −1ρ
(
∂dC
(
w∗g , d∗
)− q∗2 + q∗3).
After some rearrangements, we can therefore say that any couple (w∗g , d∗) given
by a level of groundwater extraction and a water table depth induces a station-
ary equilibrium if we can ﬁnd a vector a Lagrangian multiplicatives (q∗i )
5
i=1 which
satisﬁes:
F ′ (R)− ∂wgC(w∗g , d∗)− 1ρ∂dC
(
w∗g , d∗
)
= 1ρ (q
∗
3 − q∗2)− q∗1
Θ′(δ(R− w∗g))
(
ρ+ δ′(R− w∗g)
)− ∂wgC(w∗g , d∗) = q∗4 − q∗5 − q∗1
q∗1 · w∗g = 0, q∗2 · d∗ = 0, q∗3 ·
(
d− d∗) = 0, q∗4 · (R− w∗g) = 0 and q∗5 · w∗g = 0
The set of stationary equilibria can therefore be quite large. But if we come back to
proposition 3 (iv) and (v) and in particular to the interpretation that we gave, we
can expect that :
Lemma 5 Any stationary equilibrium is an interior point, i.e. w∗g , I∗ > 0, d∗ ∈]
0, d¯
[
and w∗s ∈ ]0, R[, or in other words (q∗i )5i=1 = 0
This preliminary result is quite interesting since it reduces the search of the
stationary equilibrium to the set of all (w∗g , d∗) in ]0, R[×
]
0, d¯
[
which solve
Φ1(w∗g , d∗) = −F ′ (R) + ∂wgC(w∗g , d∗) + 1ρ∂dC
(
w∗g , d∗
)
= 0
Φ2(w∗g , d∗) = Θ
′(δ(R− w∗g))
(
ρ+ δ′(R− w∗g)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A(w∗g)
− ∂wgC(w∗g , d∗) = 0
and under our assumptions we can even assert that :
Proposition 4 There exists a unique interior stationary equilibrium since the pre-
vious system of equations has a unique solution in ]0, R[× ]0, d¯[
The intuition beyond this result is quite simple. In fact when we apply the
implicit function theorem respectively to Φ1 and Φ2 we obtain
dd
dwg
∣∣∣∣
Φ1=0
= −
∂2wg ,wgC(wg, d) +
1
ρ∂
2
d,wg
C(wg, d)
∂2wg ,dC(wg, d) +
1
ρ∂
2
d,dC(wg, d)
< 0
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and
dd
dwg
∣∣∣∣
Φ2=0
=
dA
dwg
− ∂2wg ,wgC(wg, d))
∂2wg ,dC(wg, d)
< 0
with dAdwg = −Θ”(δ(R−w∗g))×δ′(R−w∗g)×
(
ρ+ δ′(R− w∗g)
)−δ”(R−w∗g)×Θ′(δ(R−
w∗g)) < 0
So (see ﬁgure 1) if the relative slopes of this two curves are well-behaved and
the curves (Φ1(wg, d) = 0) and (Φ2(wg, d) = 0) cut the border of the box [0, R] ×[
0, d¯
]
respectively at (2)-(4) and (3)-(1), we obtain the existence and uniqueness of a
stationary equilibrium. The ﬁrst result is induced by the study of the Jacobian of Φ
and requires assumptions 2 and 3 on pumping cost and investment while the second
result follows from boundary behaviors and therefore requires assumption 4.
-
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Figure 1: The long run equilibrium
If we look at this picture, we can even go a step further. In fact, let us remember
that the steady state of a our groundwater extraction model without investment can
be obtained by solving Φ1(R, dNI) = 0. It follows that the depth of the aquifer is
given by the intersection of (Φ1(wg, d) = 0) and the right border wg = R. We can
therefore easily compare the two situations.
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Proposition 5 By allowing water harvesting, we observe that :
(i) there is in the long run a pure substitution between the use of ground and
harvested water; i.e. w∗g + w∗s = R
(ii) but there is in the short run a over-exploitation of the aquifer so that in the
long run the aquifer will be deeper, i.e. dNI < d
∗
Conclusion
This paper derives the standard groundwater extraction model in order to introduce
the opportunity for accessing a new source of water, i.e. rainwater, through invest-
ment in capital. Rainwater Harvesting is a technology requiring investment to build
and to maintain an irrigation capacity that can be used jointly with groundwater.
The derived conclusion of this model leads us to observe that the level of the aquifer,
at the steady state, will be deeper in the presence of this irrigation capacity. This
steady state results from the trade-oﬀ driving marginal costs of exploiting the aquifer
and investing.
However, to isolate the eﬀect of rainwater harvesting on groundwater extraction
as well as on the level of the aquifer depth, we consider the simplest possible dynamic
setting with (i) a simple bathtub aquifer, i.e. a ﬂat bottom with parallel sides, (ii)
the social planner approach (iii) complete information on hydrological characteristics
(iv) no uncertainty on capital.
These simpliﬁcations call for future extensions. Namely, in line with the literature
relaxing some Gisser-Sanchez assumptions, it could be interesting to incorporate
more accurate depiction of groundwater hydrology and rainwater variability. For
instance, Brozovic and al. [3] or Saak and Peterson [34] integrate spatially variable
feature such as the speed of lateral ﬂow or diﬀerences in the elevation of bottom.
Thus, within our framework, one can expect that the consideration of a two-cell
aquifer where the elevation of bottom diﬀers across location may impact our result
through the trade-oﬀ based on marginal costs.
Another more scrupulous characterization could lead us to incorporate uncertain-
ties about rainfall variability following, for instance, Fisher and Rubio [8] who model
water resources as a stochastic process and focus on the determination of long-run
water storage capacity. Actually, the failure to include uncertainty can lead to costly
errors. In other words, by reckoning random capital in order to capture ﬂuctuations
in precipitations, one can expect that the level of the aquifer depth in the steady
state will dependent on risk behavior as well as the uncertainty level.
Thus, various reﬁnements can be stemmed from this model allowing for more
detailed approach. Nevertheless, expected results should be relatively similar with
our primary ﬁnding, i.e. the impact of the aquifer. Hence, one can wonder about
the meaning of this result with respect to the principle of sustainable development.
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Actually, groundwater insures also the maintenance of ecosystem health which gives
it a conservation value. In other words, on can wonder whether the implementation
of this technology does not challenge the sustainable level of groundwater which
insures all its functions.
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Appendix
Proof of lemma 1
Point (i) : ∀d, p, argmaxwg∈Ω1(d)H1 (wg, d, p) is a singleton.
Let us ﬁrst observe that ∂2wg,wgH1 (wg, d, p) = F ′′(wg) − ∂2wg,wgC(wg, d) < 0. The Hamiltonian is
therefore strictly concave in wg. From that point of view, the result is obvious for d = d¯ because we
maximize a continuous strictly concave function on Ω(d¯) = {wg ∈ R : 0 ≤ wg ≤ R} a non-empty,
compact and convex set. But when d ∈ ]0, d¯[, Ω1(d) = R+ is no longer bounded from above. We
nevertheless know from assumptions (1) and (2) that :
lim
wg→+∞
∂wgH1 (wg, d, p) = lim
wg→+∞
(
F ′(wg)− ∂wgC(wg, d) + p
)
= −∞.
So if we impose a ﬁnite bound Kn and push this bound to +∞, it is impossible to construct a
sequence of maxima wˆng → +∞ since, after some rank N , the ﬁrst order necessary condition will
not be met. This unbounded problem has therefore a solution and even a unique one since H1 is
strictly concave and Ω1(d) is convex. Finally if d = 0, then Ω1(0) = [R,+∞[ and we can argue as
previously as long as R < Kn.
Proof of proposition 1
It remains to verify that the Hamiltonian H1 (wg, d, p) is strictly concave in (wg, d) and that the
diﬀerent constraints are quasi-concave in these variables. This last condition is always satisﬁed
since our constraints are linear. So let us now compute for each p, the Hessian of H1 (wg, d, p). We
obtain :
∂2H1 =
[
F”− ∂2wg,wgC −∂2wg,dC
−∂2wg,dC −∂2d,dC
]
This matrix is, under assumption (1) and (2), negative deﬁnite since ∂2wg,wgH1 = F”−∂2wg,wgC < 0
and det
(
∂2H1
)
= −F” · ∂2d,dC +
(
∂2wg,wgC · ∂2d,dC −
(
∂2wg,dC
)2)
> 0
Proof of proposition 2
Point (i) : Existence of a unique steady state
By construction, we know that the steady state satisﬁes :
b(w∗g , d
∗) = 0⇔

w∗g = R
F ′(R)− ∂wC(R, d∗)− 1
ρ
∂dCd(R, d
∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ(d)
= 0
We therefore only have to check that φ(d) = 0 admit a unique solution in
[
0, d¯
]
. So let us ﬁrst
observe, by assumption (4) that :{
φ(0) = F ′(R)− ∂wC(R, 0)− 1ρ∂dCd(R, 0) > 0
φ(d¯) = F ′(R)− ∂wC(R, d¯)− 1ρ∂dCd(R, d¯) < F ′(R)− ∂wC(0, d¯) < 0
Since φ(d) is continuous, there exists at least one d∗ ∈ ]0, d¯[ such that φ(d∗) = 0. If φ′(d) < 0, this
one is even unique. This is the case under assumption (2) because :
φ′(d) = −∂2w,dC(R, d)− 1
ρ
∂2d,dCd(R, d) < 0
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Point (ii) : The local saddle point dynamic
Since we deal with a two dimensional linear system, we can use the standard results on the trace
and the determinant in order to characterize its dynamic. In fact, if the determinant is negative,
we deal with a saddle point dynamic. So let us observe that :
det(A) =
 ρ
(
F”−∂2wg,wgC
)
F”−∂2wg,wgC
∣∣∣∣
(w∗g ,d∗)
− ρ∂
2
wg,d
C+∂2d,dC
F”−∂2wg,wgC
∣∣∣∣
(w∗g ,d∗)
1 0

=
ρ∂2wg,dC + ∂
2
d,dC
F”− ∂2wg,wgC
∣∣∣∣∣
(w∗g ,d∗)
< 0
Computations related to remark 1
lim
∆I→0+
J (∆I, 0, tI)− J (0, 0, 0)
∆I
= lim
∆I→0+
1
∆I
( ∫ tI
0
(C (R, d0)− C (R−∆I · t, d0)−Θ(∆I)) exp−ρt dt
+
∫∞
tI
(C (R, d0)− C (R−∆I · tI , d0)) exp−ρt dt
)
=
∫ tI
0
(
∂wgC (R, d0) · t−Θ′(0)
)
exp−ρt dt+
∫ ∞
tI
(
∂wgC (R, d0) · tI
)
exp−ρt dt
= ∂wgC (R, d0)
([
− t
ρ
exp−ρt
]tI
0
+
∫ tI
0
1
ρ
exp−ρt dt
)
+ ∂wgC (R, d0) · tI
[
−1
ρ
exp−ρt
]∞
tI
−
(
1− exp−ρtI )
ρ
Θ′(0)
=
1
ρ
∂wgC (R, d0)
∫ tI
0
exp−ρt dt−
(
1− exp−ρtI )
ρ
Θ′(0)
=
(
1− exp−ρtI )
ρ
(
1
ρ
∂wgC (R, d0)−Θ′(0)
)
> 0
Computations related to remark 2
In a ﬁrst, we compute the ﬁrst derivative of the functional 14 with respect to twg and assessed at
twg = 0.
∂twgJ
(
∆I, twg , tI
)∣∣∣
twg=0
=
(
F
(
R+ ∆I · twg
)− C(R, d0 + ∆I · t2wg
2
)
−Θ(∆I)
)
e−ρtwg
∣∣∣∣∣
twg=0
−
(
F (R)− C
(
R−∆I · twg , d0 + ∆I ·
t2wg
2
)
−Θ(∆I)
)
e−ρtwg
∣∣∣∣∣
twg=0
−
∫ tI
twg
(
∂dC
(
R−∆I · t, d0 + ∆I ·
t2wg
2
)
·∆I · twg
)
exp−ρt dt
∣∣∣∣∣
twg=0
−
∫ ∞
tI
(
∂dC
(
R−∆I · tI , d0 + ∆I ·
t2wg
2
)
·∆I · twg
)
exp−ρt dt
∣∣∣∣∣
twg=0
= (F (R)− C (R, d0)−Θ(∆I))− (F (R)− C (R, d0)−Θ(∆I)) = 0
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With the same method, we now compute the second derivative with respect to twg and assessed at
twg = 0. After a tedious derivation, we obtain :
∂2twg ,twgJ
(
∆I, twg , tI
)∣∣∣
twg=0
= F ′ (R) ·∆I − ρ [F (R)− C (R, d0)−Θ(∆I)]− ∂wgC (R, d0) ·∆I + ρ (F (R)− C (R, d0)−Θ(∆I))
−
∫ tI
0
(∂dC (R−∆I · t, d0) ·∆I) exp−ρt dt−
∫ ∞
tI
(∂dC (R−∆I · tI , d0) ·∆I) exp−ρt dt
= ∆I ·
(
F ′ (R)− ∂wgC (R, d0)−
∫ tI
0
∂dC (R−∆I · t, d0) exp−ρt dt+ 1
ρ
∂dC (R−∆I · tI , d0) · exp−ρtI
)
Now remember that d0 was set at the steady state of the system without harvesting. We therefore
know that F ′ (R) − ∂wgC (R, d0) = 1ρ∂dC (R, d0). Since ∂dC (R−∆I · t, d0) is decreasing in t
because ∂2wg ;dC > 0, we can therefore say that :
∂2twg ,twgJ
(
∆I, twg , tI
)∣∣∣
twg=0
≥ ∆I ·
(
1
ρ
∂dC (R, d0)− ∂dC (R, d0)
∫ tI
0
exp−ρt dt− 1
ρ
∂dC (R−∆I · tI , d0) · exp−ρtI
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=A
and we can observe since ∂2wg ;dC > 0, that the right-hand side term is positive.
A = ∆I ·
(
1
ρ
∂dC (R, d0)− ∂dC (R, d0)
[
−1
ρ
exp−ρt
]tI
0
− 1
ρ
∂dC (R−∆I · tI , d0) · exp−ρtI
)
=
∆I
ρ
· (∂dC (R, d0) + ∂dC (R−∆I · tI , d0)) · exp−ρtI > 0
Proof of lemma 3
Since we deal with a model with one mixed and four pure state constraints, we normally have to
check that (see Grass and al. ([12]) th 3.60) :
Q1 =
[
∂wg,I(wg), wg
]
and Q2 =

∂ωg,I
(
∂d (d) · d˙+ ∂ws (d) · w˙s
)
d 0 0 0
∂ωg,I
(
∂d
(
d¯− d) · d˙+ ∂ws (d¯− d) · w˙s) 0 d¯− d 0 0
∂ωg,I
(
∂d (ws) · d˙+ ∂ws (ws) · w˙s
)
0 0 ws 0
∂ωg,I
(
∂d (R− ws) · d˙+ ∂ws (R− ws) · w˙s
)
0 0 0 R− ws

are both of full rank. So let us observe that :
Q1 =
[
1 0 wg
]
and Q2 =

1 0 d 0 0 0
−1 0 0 d¯− d 0 0
0 1 0 0 ws 0
0 −1 0 0 0 R− ws

Q1 is obviously of full rank. Concerning Q2, let us remember d¯, R > 0. This means that we can
always choose a non zero vector when we respectively consider the columns 3, 4 and 5, 6. If we add
to this choice the 2 ﬁrst columns we can conclude that Q2 is of rank 4.
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Proof of lemma 4
It remains to verify that the HamiltonianH2
(
wg, I, d, ws, (pi)
2
i=1
)
is strictly concave in (wg, I, d, ws)
and that the diﬀerent constraints are quasi-concave in these variables. This last condition is always
satisﬁed since our constraints are linear. So let us now compute for each (pi)
2
i=1, the Hessian of this
Hamiltonian. We obtain by taking the following order of the variables (wg, ws, d, I)
∂2H2 =

F”− ∂2wg,wgC F” −∂2wg,dC 0
F” F”− p2δ” 0 0
−∂2wg,dC 0 −∂2d,dC 0
0 0 0 −Θ”

By keeping in mind that Θ′(I) = p2, we observe, under assumption (1), (2) and (3), that :
D1 = F”− ∂2wg,wgC < 0
D2 =
∣∣∣∣ F”− ∂2wg,wgC F”F” F”−Θ′δ”
∣∣∣∣ = −F” (∂2wg,wgC + Θ′δ”)+ Θ′δ”∂2wg,wgC > 0
D3 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
F”− ∂2wg,wgC F” −∂2wg,dC
F” F”−Θ′δ” 0
−∂2wg,dC 0 −∂2d,dC
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= F”Θ′δ”∂2d,dC +
(
F”−Θ′δ”) (∂2wg,wgC∂2d,dC − (∂2wg,dC)2) < 0
and
D4 =
∣∣∂2H2∣∣ = −Θ”D3 > 0
It follows that the Hamiltonian is strictly concave for all (pi)
2
i=1 .
Proof of proposition 3
Point (i) : along an optimal path, wg(t) + ws(t) > 0
This point follows directly from (ii) of lemma 1. In fact if ws(t) = 0, or in other words if there is
no harvesting capacity, the control wg(t) is, like in section 3, strictly positive.
Point (ii) : along an optimal path @]t0, t1[ ∀t ∈]t0, t1[, ws(t) = 0
Assume the contrary. In this case we can immediately say that ∀t ∈]t0, t1[, (i) q5(t) = 0 since the
upper bound of wg(t) is not reached, (ii) I(t) = δ(0) = 0 (see assumption (3)) since by the dynamic
of the capacity accumulation w˙s(t) = 0, (iii) p2(t) = θ
′(0) = 0 (by assumption (3)) since ∂IL2 = 0,
it follows that p˙2(t) = 0 and (iv) wg(t) > 0 (by point (i)) which implies that q1(t) = 0.
In order to obtain our contradiction, let us now use these observations and compute :{
∂wgL2 = 0
ρp2(t)− ∂wsL2 = p˙2(t) ⇔
{
F ′ (ws(t))− ∂wgC(wg(t), d(t)) + p1(t) = 0
−F ′(ws(t))− p1(t)− q4(t) = 0
By adding the two previous equations, we obtain q4(t) = −∂wgC(wg(t), d(t)) < 0 but this contra-
dicts the slackness conditions.
Point (iii) : @]t0, t1[ ∀t ∈]t0, t1[, I(t) ≤ 0 and wg(t) > 0
Assume the contrary, therefore q1(t) = 0. Moreover, by the previous point we know that ws(t) > 0
almost everywhere in ]t0, t1[ (a.e. for short) and therefore that q4(t) = 0 a.e in ]t0, t1[. We can
even go a step further by saying that q5(t) = 0 a.e in ]t0, t1[. If this is not the case ∃]t2, t3[⊂]t0, t1[,
q5(t) > 0 and therefore ws(t) = R. But, by the dynamics of the harvesting capacity we should have
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that w˙s(t) = I(t) − δ(R) = 0 which implies that I(t) = δ(R) > 0. Finally, by assumption (3) and
by ∂IL2 = 0, we can assert that ∀t ∈]t0, t1[, p2(t) = θ′(I) = 0 hence that p˙2(t) = 0.
These observations lead us to the conclusion that :{
∂wgL2 = 0
ρp2(t)− ∂wsL2 = p˙2(t) ⇔
{
F ′ (ws(t) + wg(t))− ∂wgC(wg(t), d(t)) + p1(t) = 0
−F ′(ws(t) + wg(t))− p1(t) = 0
⇒ ∂wgC(wg(t), d(t)) = 0
Since ∂wgC > 0, except for (wg(t), d(t)) = (0, 0), we contradict our assumptions.
Point (iv) : @]t0, t1[ ∀t ∈]t0, t1[, wg(t) = 0 and ws(t) = R.
Assume the contrary. Since ws(t) = R, most of the variable related to water harvesting can be
computed easily. We obtain I(t) = δ(R), p2(t) = Θ
′ (δ(R)) and p˙2(t) = 0
In order to obtain our contradiction, let us use these observations and compute :{
∂wgL2 = 0
ρp2(t)− ∂wsL2 = p˙2(t) ⇔
{
F ′ (R)− ∂wgC(0, d(t)) + p1(t) + q1(t) = 0
Θ′ (δ(R)) (ρ+ δ′(R))− F ′(R)− p1(t) + q5(t) = 0
⇒ q1(t) + q5(t) = −Θ′ (δ(R))
(
ρ+ δ′(R)
)
+ ∂wgC(0, d(t)) < −Θ′ (δ(R))
(
ρ+ δ′(R)
)
+ ∂wgC(0, d¯)
But by assumption (4), we conclude that q1(t) + q5(t) < 0, a contradiction.
Point (v) : @]t0, t1[ ∀t ∈]t0, t1[, w˙s(t) = 0 and either d0 = 0 or d0 = d¯ ( and so d˙(t) = 0)
Assume the contrary. So let w0s , w
0
g stand for the constant values of ws(t) and wg(t) with w
0
s +w
0
g =
R. In this case, we also observe that I(t) = δ(w0s), p2 = Θ
′ (δ(w0s)) so that p˙2(t) = 0
Now let us remark that :{
∂wgL2 = 0
ρp2(t)− ∂wsL2 = p˙2(t) ⇔
{
F ′ (R)− ∂wgC(w0g, d0) + p1(t) + q1(t) = 0
Θ′
(
δ(w0s)
) (
ρ+ δ′(w0s)
)− F ′(R)− p1(t) + q5(t) = 0
⇒ q1(t) + q5(t) = −Θ′
(
δ(w0s)
) (
ρ+ δ′(w0s)
)
+ ∂wgC(w
0
g, d0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=φ(w0g,w
0
s)
Now remember that q1(t) + q5(t) ≥ 0 and w0s +w0g = R, so that φ(R−w0s , w0s) ≥ 0 with w0s ∈ [0, R].
Moreover under assumption (2) and (3) :
dφ
dw0s
(R−w0s , w0s) = −∂2wg,wgC(R−w0s , d0)−Θ”
(
δ(w0s)
)
δ′(w0s)
(
ρ+ δ′(w0s)
)−Θ′ (δ(w0s)) δ”(w0s) < 0
and under either the fact ∂wgC(0, 0) = 0 for d0 = 0 or assumption (4) for d0 = d¯
lim
w0s→R
φ(R− w0s , w0s) = −Θ′ (δ(R))
(
ρ+ δ′(R)
)
+ ∂wgC(0, d0) < 0
This means that q1(t) + q5(t) ≥ 0 is only true for w0s < R. But this implies by the slackness
conditions that q5(t) = 0, and since w
0
s + w
0
g = R, then w
0
g > 0 and therefore q1(t) = 0. Moreover
by ∂wgL2 = 0 we can even argue that p1(t) is a constant hence p˙1(t) = 0.
In order to obtain our contradiction, let us wrap all these observations and compute :
ρp1(t)− ∂dL2 = p˙1(t)⇔ ρ
(−F ′ (R) + ∂wgC(w0g, d0))+ ∂dC(w0g, d0)− q2(t) + q3(t) = 0
Since both constraints on the aquifer level cannot be binding simultaneously, we can say, under
assumption (2) and (4) that :{
for d = 0, q2(t) = ρ
(
∂wgC(w
0
g, 0)− F ′ (R)
)
+ ∂dC(w
0
g, 0) < ρ
(
∂wgC(R, 0)− F ′ (R)
)
+ ∂dC(R, 0) < 0
for d = d¯, q3(t) = ρ
(
F ′ (R)− ∂wgC(w0g, d¯)
)− ∂dC(w0g, d¯) < ρ (F ′ (R)− ∂wgC(0, d¯)) < 0
But this contradicts the slackness conditions.
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Proof of lemma 5
Let us check that the solutions to
F ′ (R)− ∂wgC(w∗g , d∗)− 1ρ∂dC
(
w∗g , d
∗) = 1
ρ
(q∗3 − q∗2)− q∗1
Θ′(δ(R− w∗g))
(
ρ+ δ′(R− w∗g)
)− ∂wgC(w∗g , d∗) = q∗4 − q∗5 − q∗1
q∗1 · w∗g = 0, q∗2 · d∗ = 0, q∗3 ·
(
d− d∗) = 0, q∗4 · (R− w∗g) = 0 and q∗5 · w∗g = 0
have the property that (w∗g , d
∗) ∈ ]0, R[ × ]0, d¯[ which implies that (q∗i )5i=1 = 0. So let us assume
the contrary and let us ﬁrst observe that :
• if w∗g = 0, then q∗4 = 0 and the following contradiction is obtained under assumption (4) that
:
q∗5 + q
∗
1 = ∂wgC(0, d
∗)−Θ′(δ(R)) (ρ+ δ′(R)) < ∂wgC(0, d¯)−Θ′(δ(R)) (ρ+ δ′(R)) < 0
• if w∗g = R, then q∗1 = q∗5 = 0 and under assumptions (2) and (3), the following contradiction
comes out :
q∗4 = Θ
′(δ(0))
(
ρ+ δ′(0)
)− ∂wgC(R, d∗) = −∂wgC(R, d∗) < 0
Up to now, we know that w∗g ∈ ]0, R[, we can therefore set q∗1 = q∗4 = q∗5 = 0. So let us now observe
that :
• if d∗ = 0, then q∗3 = 0 and under assumptions (2) and (4), we have that :
1
ρ
q∗2 = ∂wgC(w
∗
g , 0) +
1
ρ
∂dC
(
w∗g , 0
)− F ′ (R) < ∂wgC(R, 0) + 1ρ∂dC (R, 0)− F ′ (R) < 0
• if d∗ = d¯, then q∗2 = 0 and under the same assumptions as before we can say that :
1
ρ
q∗3 = F
′ (R)− ∂wgC(w∗g , d¯)−
1
ρ
∂dC
(
w∗g , d¯
)
< F ′ (R)− ∂wgC(0, d¯) < 0
Proof of proposition 4
Let Φ : [0, R]× [0, d¯]→ R2 be deﬁned by :
Φ(wg, d) =
(
Φ1(wg, d)
Φ2(wg, d)
)
=
( −F ′(R) + 1
ρ
∂dC(wg, d) + ∂wqC(wg, d)
Θ (δ(R− ωg)) (ρ+ δ′ (R− ωg))− ∂wqC(wg, d)
)
We have to proof that there exists a unique (w∗g , d
∗) with the property that Φ(w∗g , d
∗) = 0 and
(w∗g , d
∗) ∈ ]0, R[× ]0, d¯[
The method
The method relies on a degree theory argument. In fact, we know from Hirsch [14] (see also Mas-
Colell [22] p 207-208) that if there exists a map G : [0, R]× [0, d¯]→ R2 with the properties that
(i) G admits a unique regular solution (i.e. deg(G) = 1),
(ii) H (wg, d, λ) = λ · G (wg, d) + (1− λ) · Φ (wg, d) , with λ ∈ [0, 1], is a regular homotopy (i.e.
∂H (wg, d, λ) is of full rank)
(iii) the 1-manifold H−1 (0) ⊂ (]0, R[× ]0, d¯[)× [0, 1],
then F admits at least one solution (i.e. deg(Φ) = 1). Moreover if
(iv) the index of each solution (i.e the sign of the determinant of ∂Φ(wg, d) at that point) is
constant,
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we know that the solution is unique.
Step (i) : Construction of G (wg, d)
Let us ﬁrst deﬁne G (wg, d, ) =
(
d− δ
ω − wg
)
with (ω, δ) ∈ ]0, R[ × ]0, d¯[ two parameters which
will be speciﬁed later. It is immediate that G (wg, d, ) = 0 admits a unique solution given by
(wg, d) = (ω, δ) and that det (∂G (ω, δ)) =
∣∣∣∣ 0 1−1 0
∣∣∣∣ = 1, so deg(G) = 1
Step (ii) : Existence of a regular homotopy H (wg, d, λ)
Let us ﬁrst choose (ω, δ) ∈ ]0, R[× ]0, d¯[. In fact a simple computation shows that
∀λ > 0, rank (∂(ω,δ)H (wg, d, λ; (ω, δ))) = rank([ 0 −λλ 0
])
= 2
It follows by the generic transversality theorem (see Mas-colell [22] p 45) that for almost all (ω, δ) ∈
]0, R[ × ]0, d¯[, and λ > 0, ∂(wg,d,λ)H (wg, d, λ;ω, δ) is of full rank. So let us ﬁx one of them. It
remains to verify that for λ = 0, ∂H (wg, d, λ) is also of full rank. If this is true, H is a regular
homotopy. So, by a simple computation :
det (∂Φ) =
[
1
ρ
∂2d,wgC + ∂
2
wq,wgC
1
ρ
∂2d,dC + ∂
2
wq,dC
dA
dwg
− ∂2wq,wqC −∂2wq,dC
]
=
1
ρ
(
∂2wq,wgC · ∂2d,dC −
(
∂2d,wgC
)2)− dA
dwg
·
(
1
ρ
∂2d,dC + ∂
2
wq,dC
)
with A(wg) = Θ (δ(R− ωg)) (ρ+ δ′ (R− ωg)). And our assumptions on the cost function (see
assumption (2)) and the production of a water harvesting capacity (see assumption (3)) tell us that
det (∂Φ) > 0, which implies that ∂H (wg, d, 0) is of full rank.
Step (iii) : The interiority of 1-manifold H−1 (0)
Let us assume the contrary. This means that there exists a sequence
(
wng , d
n, λn
) ∈ H−1 (0) and(
wng , d
n, λn
)→ (w0g, d0, λ0) ∈ ({0, R} × {0, d¯})× [0, 1]. But let us observe that :
• assumption (4) and the fact that ∂wgΦ1(wg, d) > 0 bring us to the conclusion that :{ ∀wg ∈ [0, R] , Φ1(wg, 0) = −F ′(R) + 1ρ∂dC(wg, 0) + ∂wqC(wg, 0) < 0
∀wg ∈ [0, R] , Φ1(wg, d¯) = −F ′(R) + 1ρ∂dC(wg, d¯) + ∂wqC(wg, d¯) > 0
• by the same assumption and the fact that ∂dΦ2(wg, d) < 0, we can say that :
∀d ∈ [0, R] , Φ2(0, d) = Θ (δ(R))
(
ρ+ δ′ (R)
)− ∂wqC(0, d) > 0
• ﬁnally the property of the harvesting technology (assumption (3)) and the fact that ∂wqC(R, d)
lead to:
∀d ∈ [0, R] , Φ2(R, d) = −∂wqC(R, d) < 0
It follows, from the ﬁrst observation, that ∀ (wg, λ) ∈ [0, R]× [0, 1]{
H1(wg, 0, λ) = −λd1 + (1− λ) Φ1(wg, 0) < 0
H1(wg, d¯, λ) = λ
(
d¯− d1
)
+ (1− λ) Φ1(wg, d¯) > 0
It is therefore impossible that there exists a sequence
(
wng , d
n, λn
) ∈ H−1 (0) with dn → d0 ∈{
0, d¯
}
. Let us now move the the second and the third observations. We respectively conclude that
∀ (d, λ) ∈ [0, d¯]× [0, 1] {
H2(0, d, λ) = λw1 + (1− λ) Φ2(0, d) > 0
H2(R, d, λ) = λ(w1 −R) + (1− λ) Φ2(R, d) < 0
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Hence @
(
wng , d
n, λn
) ∈ H−1 (0) with wng → w0g ∈ {0, R} and this concludes step (iii).
Step (iv) : the uniqueness of the solution.
At step (ii) we have observed that ∀ (wg, d) ∈ ]0, R[×
]
0, d¯
[
, det (∂Φ) > 0. It follows the the index
of each solution is constant (i.e. equal to one). Uniqueness follows.
Proof of proposition 5
Obvious.
30
